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1 Introduction
This paper introduces mortal conflict and violence into Diamond’s (1965) overlapping genera-
tions model. Past work has focussed on more benign forms of conflict in dynamic economies,
such as rent-seeking and predation of property, and has failed to consider the socially far
more costly types of conflicts that result in lost lives.1,2 Apart from its social significance,
mortal conflict presents an interesting theoretical challenge because it introduces an endoge-
nous risk of death that depends on the actions of all the adversaries engaged in conflict.
As Chakraborty (2004) and others have shown, having endogenous survival probability can
have significant effects on capital accumulation. However, this work has not recognized the
strategic aspect of survival that arises naturally with mortal conflict and that may complicate
our understanding of dynamic economies.
We develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in order to address various
issues related to violence, which we narrowly define as actions that are intended to result
in death. Thus, we do not distinguish between personal and collective violence to focus on
elements common to both. Our focus is motivated by findings that the scale of killing from
homicide or civil war is comparable and that different forms of lethal violence are driven
by some of the same economic processes (Neumeyer, 2003, and Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004).3
Our study is further motivated by conventional opinion that violence inhibits development
or that development inhibits violence. Because such thinking is not based on any formal
analytical framework, it is difficult to fathom the ultimate outcome of corrective measures
and proposals for conflict resolution. Such sentiments are also insufficient to explain the
1For recent examples see Grossman and Kim (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), and Gonzalez (2006). A
large literature builds on the seminal contribution by Tullock (1980) and models conflict and rent-seeking
as static contests in which individuals compete for a prize by spending resources, where the prize is either
exogenous or endogenous. The conflict literature is reviewed by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2006), while the
rent-seeking literature is surveyed by Congleton (2006).
2The social cost of wasted resources has been previously emphasized in the conflict literature. But this
welfare loss probably pales in comparison to the social cost of violent deaths, which can be substantial, as
indicated in empirical studies by Hess (2003) and Soares (2006).
3Because we are primarily interested in forces that affect all types of violence, we do not consider forces
that only appear to affect homicide or civil war individually such as ethno-linguistic fractionalization or
inequality (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004). While such variables may be of further interest, the empirical
literature does not seem to have settled on an answer whether, and if so how, inequality affects crime or
ethnicity affects civil war, according to Dahlberg and Gustavsson (2005) and Esteban and Ray (2006).
1
large variety of outcomes across time and space noted by, for instance, Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman (1996), and documented in the recent World Report on Violence and Health
(Krug et al., 2002). It is, furthermore, not clear whether these sentiments refer to short-run
or long-run movements or what the underlying economic forces are that drive them.
The setting we study is a conventional production economy with a single consumption
good. This economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of two-period lived individuals
who work when young and save for old age. Not everyone survives to old-age because of
a survival contest among the young that takes the form of a simple Tullock (1980) contest.
Thus, we take as a starting point the Hobbesian jungle with “continual fear and danger of
violent death” and are able to compare it with the peaceful environments encountered in the
growth and development economics literature (as surveyed recently in Aghion and Durlauf,
2005). Not only does mortal conflict lead to deaths, it also uses up resources that could
otherwise be consumed or saved. For the individual these resource costs are the price of
survival, while the prize of survival is the ability to consume the fruits of one’s past savings.
Savings thus acts as a source of future consumption and effectively as a prize in the survival
game and it is this dual role that provides the essential tension in the model. Not only
do savings and capital influence violence, but they are also influenced by violence through
the endogenous survival probability. The tension is resolved simultaneously with the Nash
equilibrium of the violent survival contest and with the clearing of the capital market.
To foreshadow some of our results, in the early part of this paper we establish existence
and uniqueness of the dynamic Nash equilibrium. We also characterize the Nash equilibrium
trajectory for this economy and how lethal violence interacts with capital along the equilib-
rium path. We show that violence and development are always negatively related along the
adjustment path to steady state, and thus we provide a formal analytical framework con-
sistent with the conventional opinion that motivates our paper. However, when the focus
is on the steady state effects of shocks to economic fundamentals, we find that shocks that
encourage capital deepening can have a variety of effects on violence. For example, some
types of shocks that effectively lengthen an individuals horizon yield growth accompanied
by violence, whereas other types of shocks related to the pressures for violent appropriation
can yield growth accompanied by a reduction in violence. By pressure variables we mean
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changes in the population growth rate or the degree winners can plunder or appropriate
resources from losers, where the first can loosely be interpreted as population crowding and
the second as varying degrees of property rights enforcement (or weak governance), though
strictly speaking we take political and social institutions as given. Our results also indicate
that dynamically efficient economies with violence may benefit from a different and more
nuanced set of anti-violence measures than dynamically inefficient economies and we discuss
how our work might be translated into real world counterparts.
One advantage of our approach is that it yields a more realistic description of growth
and development that has antecedents in the writings of Malthus, who linked violence to
population pressures, and Hobbes, who linked a natural state of violent anarchy to the rise
of absolutist government (Kavka, 1983).4 Another advantage is that we can move beyond
the non-violent interactions analyzed in the conflict and crime literatures. Because the
conflicts analyzed are typically ones in which there are no human casualties, the literature
has had little to say about the human tragedy and social cost of lost lives that is a central
concern for the public and that periodically mobilizes policymakers. Similarly, the crime
literature following the work of Becker (1968) has mainly focussed on property crimes.5
Homicides have been treated separately, partly because such crimes were not thought to
be economically motivated. One exception is Donohue and Levitt (1998), who also treat
violence as a contest, but without the deadly consequences and without the link to a broader
intertemporal framework considered in the present paper.
4Malthus (1798) identifies preventative and positive checks on population growth. Recent work on
the demographic transition has emphasized the preventative checks by focussing primarily on endogenous
fertility as a check on excess population growth. Our work fits more in the category of a Malthusian positive
check, though we are not primarily concerned with the effect on population. As Wolfe (1942) writes “War
is one of the positive checks to population growth, but it may be doubted whether modern wars, despite
the high mortality that they cause, have more than a momentary effect on the balance between population
and productive resources. Unless the warring peoples are already at a sheer subsistence level, it is doubtful
whether war losses will much reduce the felt pressure of population. It is extremely difficult to judge the
effects of war on standards of living afterwards, because of the large number of dynamic economic, political,
technological, and social factors involved.” It is the effects of lethal violence on standards of living (and vice
versa) that we are primarily concerned with.
5Starting with work by I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000), and continuing with Burdett, Lagos, and
Wright (2003) and Huang, Laing and Wang (2004), there has been much recent interest in analyzing property
crime in dynamic general equilibrium models. Our focus on violence with varying degress of property crime
or plunder may be thought of as a complement to this recent work.
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2 The Environment
The setting is Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model with production. Time
is discrete and in each period t ≥ 1 there is a population Nt that grows at a rate of n.
Individuals are born in periods t ≥ 1 and live and consume for two periods, working and
saving in the first period of their life. Not everyone survives to old age because of mortal
conflict. Mortal conflict is modeled as a Tullock (1980) contest where adversaries must
devote resources in the first period to survive to the second period of their lives. Production
is standard with perfectly competitive firms combining labor and capital to produce a single
consumption good.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology and that there is complete depre-
ciation of capital. If we define kt as the capital-labor ratio and yt as output per capita,
then the Cobb-Douglas form with Hicks-neutral technological progress can be represented by
yt = A (kt)
α where 0 < α < 1 and A > 0 is the technology parameter. Perfectly competitive
firms maximize their profits in every period which implies optimality conditions of
wt = (1− α)A (kt)
α (1)
rt = αA (kt)
α−1 (2)
where wt is the wage rate in period t and rt is the real interest rate in t.
The population is divided into two equal sized groups of identical individuals. All
individuals born in periods t ≥ 1 may live for two periods. In the first period of their life,
they inelastically supply a unit of labor and earn wt. Earnings are allocated to consumption,
savings for old age, and conflict. Specifically, individuals spend a fraction of wages on mortal
conflict xitwt, where x
i
t is the propensity for violence which we will call violence for short with
the understanding that this refers to activities with the intent to kill. Consumption in the
first period equals net wages wt (1− x
i
t) less savings s
i
t. Consumption in the second period
of life equals the return to savings rt+1s
i
t (an assumption we will relax later). Finally, we
note that in period t = 1, there also exists an old generation of survivors that consumes its
past savings.
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Individuals choose savings and violence to maximize expected lifetime utility. Lifetime
utility is a discounted sum of first and second period utilities, where the second period utility
is discounted by β ∈ (0, 1) and is multiplied by the endogenous probability of survival πit.
Utility in every period is assumed to have constant intertemporal substitution so that lifetime
utility is represented by
(wt (1− x
i
t)− s
i
t)
1−θ−1
1− θ−1
+ πitβ
(rt+1s
i
t)
1−θ−1
1− θ−1
(3)
We assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ is greater than one, an assump-
tion that will be helpful in several ways. First, the assumption guarantees the existence
of an interior Nash equilibrium for the survival contest. Second, the assumption implies a
unique interior intertemporal equilibrium so that we can focus on capital-violence dynam-
ics without the interesting complication of multiple equilibria and development traps (see
Azariadis, 1996).
Individuals compete for survival assuming a contest success function introduced by Tul-
lock (1980) and later axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). We adopt a simple form of this
contest success function, an assumption that is not critical but makes for uncomplicated
comparisons with later sections. Individual i spends resources xitwt to increase i’s proba-
bility of survival πit which is determined by the actions of all adversaries i and j according
to:
πit =
Nt
2
(xitwt)
Nt
2
(xitwt) +
Nt
2
(
xjtwt
)ψ (4)
where Σiπ
i
t = ψ ≤ 1 and 1− ψ is the deadliness of the conflict in the sense that it gives the
probability of mutual destruction. Though we are mainly concerned with interior solutions,
we assume that πit =
1
2
ψ when xit = 0 for all adversaries i. The contest between two identical
groups can be interpreted either as a war between balanced forces or as individual one-on-one
survival contests where individuals are randomly matched from the two sides.6 As mentioned
in the introduction, we do not distinguish between personal and collective violence in order
to focus on elements common to both. Thus, we sidestep the important question of why
6Another interpretation for our survival contest is that of an extreme form of self-protection or vigilantism.
Rather than taking purely defensive protective actions as in the crime literature, individuals take offensive
and potentially lethal survival actions.
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there is violence in the first place and how violent groups form and take the Hobbesian view
of violence as a pre-existing condition and fact of life. We note that agent i’s contest success
function increases in xit and decreases in x
j
t according to
dπit
dxit
=
πit (1− π
i
t/ψ)
xit
> 0,
dπit
dxjt
=
−πit (1− π
i
t/ψ)
xjt
< 0
Individuals choose violence and savings to maximize (3) given the contest success function
defined in (4). There are two first order conditions from lifetime utility maximization. First,
there is the Euler condition that equates the marginal cost from saving (on the left hand
side) and the marginal benefit:(
wt
(
1− xit
)
− sit
)
−θ−1
= πitβrt+1
(
rt+1s
i
t
)
−θ−1
(5)
Also, there is a conflict condition that equates the marginal benefit of conflict (on the left
hand side) to the the marginal cost of conflict:
dπit
dxit
β (rt+1s
i
t)
1−θ−1
1− θ−1
= wt
(
wt
(
1− xit
)
− sit
)
−θ−1
(6)
Using the Euler condition to substitute for the marginal cost of saving in (6) implies a
conflict condition that resembles those of contest literature:
dπit
dxit
V it = π
i
t where V
i
t =
θ
θ − 1
sit
wt
(7)
Consistent with the contest literature we interpret V it as the endogenous prize in the conflict.
Thus, the prize in the survival contest is living until old age and being able to consume the
savings of youth. Normally, in the contest literature the marginal cost of conflict is one,
not πit as it is here. The difference is not essential since the outcome is still a best-response
function xit = x(x
j
t , V
i
t ), where x
i
t reacts positively to changes in x
j
t .
Finally, we close the model by considering the aggregate resource constraint. The ag-
gregate resource constraint is satisfied when output is fully allocated to consumption by the
young and the old as well as to investment. The resource constraint is equivalent to a capital
accumulation equation that equates investment to savings, or resources not consumed:
(1 + n) kt+1 = st = Σi
1
2
sit (8)
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3 Dynamic Nash Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium in the model, we first derive the within period Nash equilib-
rium and then use this information to derive the intertemporal equilibrium. The first-order
conditions of the individual imply conditional solutions for savings and violence:
xit = Λ
i
t
sit
wt
(9)
sit = J
i
t+1wt
(
1− xit
)
(10)
where we define Λit = (1− π
i
t/ψ) (1− θ
−1)
−1
, J it+1 =
(
1 +Qit+1
)
−1
, as well as Qit+1 =
(πitβ)
−θ
(rt+1)
1−θ . These conditional solutions are interdependent and will be solved out
after the Nash equilibrium has been determined.
The Nash equilibrium is solved for by forming marginal benefit-cost ratios from the
conflict condition (6) and equating them for all individuals. This implies that violence is
identical for all individuals, or xt = x
i
t = x
j
t , and that the survival probabilities are also
identical, or π = πit =
1
2
ψ. Because violence and survival probabilities are identical, savings
also must be identical according to the conditional savings function, or st = s
i
t = s
j
t .
Next we remove the interdependence of the conditional solutions by solving (9) and (10)
for xt and st. This implies that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium violence and savings are
xt(rt+1) =
J(rt+1)Λ
1 + J(rt+1)Λ
(11)
st (wt, rt+1) =
J(rt+1)
1 + J(rt+1)Λ
wt (12)
where xt(rt+1) ∈ [0, 1] and st (wt, rt+1) ∈ [0, wt] and where we define
Λ =
1
2
θ
θ − 1
and J(rt+1) =
1
1 +Qt+1
and Qt+1 = (
1
2
ψβ)−θ (rt+1)
1−θ (13)
To understand the forces that influence violence and savings, we totally differentiate
xt(rt+1) in (11) and st (wt, rt+1) in (12), where to avoid clutter we have left out time sub-
scripts:
dx = xwdw + xrdr + xβdβ + xψdψ (14)
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where
xw = 0
xr =
x
r
(1− x) (1− J) (θ − 1) > 0,
xβ =
x
β
(1− x) (1− J) θ > 0,
xψ =
x
ψ
(1− x) (1− J) θ > 0
and
ds = swdw + srdr + sβdβ + sψdψ (15)
where
sw =
s
w
∈ (0, 1) ,
sr =
s
r
(1− x) (1− J) (θ − 1) > 0,
sβ =
s
β
(1− x) (1− J) θ > 0,
sψ =
s
ψ
(1− x) (1− J) θ > 0
The intuition for the comparative static results is straightforward. First, higher wages
have an income effect that increases savings. At the same time, the marginal benefit and
cost of conflict do not change, resulting in no change in violence. This neutrality result
hinges on the fact that higher wages leave the prize s
w
unchanged, which is a direct result
of our assumption of homothetic utility. Second, a higher interest rate increases savings
since the substitution effect outweighs the wealth effect for θ > 1. Increased savings leads
to a higher prize and so increases violence by increasing the marginal benefit of conflict
relative to the marginal cost. Third, a higher utility discount factor has a similar effect to a
higher interest rate except that there is only a substitution effect on savings as the subjective
valuation of youthful consumption falls. In other words, greater patience increases the value
of the second period prize and, thus, violence. Finally, greater deadliness of conflict has an
effect that is entirely analogous to greater impatience, both tending to shorten the effective
lifetime horizon of the individual and reducing the value of the prize and the return to saving.
We summarize our findings in
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Proposition 1. (Nash Equilibrium) There exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium for
violence xt(rt+1) and savings st (wt, rt+1) . A higher wage rate increases savings but does not
affect violence. A higher interest rate, a higher rate of patience, or a lower deadliness of
conflict increases savings and violence.
For comparison with the Hobbesian jungle considered here, individuals living in a conflict-
free society have xpt = 0 and Λ
p = 0 so that spt = Jwt in (12). Thus, the marginal propensity
to save out of wages is higher in the peaceful society than for individuals who face mortal
conflict. This is sensible, because no resources have to be devoted to conflict. Also, the
response of savings to interest rates sr is higher in the peaceful society because there is no
additional siphoning of resources from violence rising with the interest rate.
The dynamics of this economy are described by the path of capital. In equilibrium, the
dynamics are characterized by a set of equations
(1 + n) kt+1 = st (wt, rt+1) =
J(rt+1)
1 + J(rt+1)Λ
wt (16)
J(rt+1) =
1
1 +Q(rt+1)
with Q(rt+1) = (
1
2
ψβ)−θ (rt+1)
1−θ (17)
wt = (1− α)A (kt)
α (18)
rt+1 = αA (kt+1)
α−1 (19)
where Λ is defined in (13). Violence xt(rt+1) can be determined recursively using (11) once
the equilibrium time path for kt has been determined.
It is straightforward to show that there exists a unique interior equilibrium trajectory
for capital (kt) for any given initial capital stock k0 > 0. Proof of this assertion follows
Galor and Ryder (1989). Existence is demonstrated by defining a continuous excess demand
function for capital et ≡ (1 + n) kt+1 − st (wt, rt+1) and letting kt+1 vary continuously from
zero to infinity as kt and thus wt are held constant. When kt+1 → ∞, et > 0 because
st < wt and (wt/kt+1) → 0. When kt+1 → 0, et < 0 because sr > 0 so that st → ∞.
The intermediate value theorem then implies that there exists a positive kt+1 such that the
excess demand for capital is zero. Uniqueness follows from the fact that et is a monotone
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function of kt+1 because sr > 0. Because of the monotonicity, we can invert (16) and form
a relationship
kt+1 = g (kt) with g
′ (kt) =
−swktf
′′ (kt)
1 + n− srf ′′ (kt+1)
where the latter follows by the implicit function theorem. Later, we will explicitly show
that g (kt) is concave when the structure of conflict is varied. For now, we conclude with
Proposition 2. (Dynamic Equilibrium) Given an initial capital stock k0 > 0, there
exists a unique interior dynamic equilibrium path for capital (kt) for t ≥ 1.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we study the transition to steady state and how the steady state equilibrium
responds to various shocks. As a first step in the analysis, we show that with mortal conflict
kt+1 is a concave function of kt and that xt is a convex function of kt+1. Specifically, we find
g′ (kt) =
Jαwt
kt
(1 + n) (1 + Υ (1− x))
> 0
g′′ (kt) = − (g
′)
2 Υ
g
[
1 +
Υ(1− x)
1 + Υ (1− x)
J + (1− J) x
1− J
]
−
1− α
kt
(g′) < 0
where Υ = (1− J) (θ − 1) (1− α) is a bounded function of g (kt) . Note that to get peaceful
analogs g′P and g
′′
P , we must set x = 0 in g
′ and g′′. Also, we can see that xt = x(kt+1) ∈
[0, Λ
1+Λ
]. Violence falls over its range as kt+1 rises from zero towards infinity according to
x′(kt+1) = − (1− x) x
Υ
kt+1
< 0
x′′(kt+1) = −
[
1 +Q (1− Λ)
1 +Q+ Λ
+
1
Q
]
Υ
kt+1
−
1
kt+1
< 0
Having verified the shape of the capital and violence functions, we are now in position
to graph them in Figure 1. The equilibrium capital accumulation relationship kt+1 = g (kt)
is graphed in the right quadrant of Figure 1 and is called the KK-curve. The associated
Nash equilibrium level of violence xt = x (kt+1) is graphed in the left quadrant and is called
the XK-curve. Also, the conflict-free steady-state equilibrium is at point A, while the
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Figure 1: Peace, Violence, and Capital Accumulation
k(t)
k(t+1)
x(t)
KK
KK'
0
A
A'B'
XK'
a
steady-state equilibrium with mortal conflict is at points A’ and B’. It is readily apparent
that moving from a conflict-free steady state to one with mortal conflict lowers the steady
state capital stock.
To formally show that mortal conflict lowers steady state capital, assume that kpt+1 = kt+1
with 0 < kt+1 < ∞ so that J(r
p
t+1) = J(rt+1), where the superscript p denotes the peaceful
world. Because kpt+1 = kt+1, we also have s
p
t = st in (12) where Λ
p = 0 so that spt = Jw
p
t .
Because J(rpt+1) = J(rt+1), we see that w
p
t < wt. In other words, wages during peace are
less than wages with conflict when kpt+1 = kt+1, which implies that k
p
t < kt when k
p
t+1 = kt+1.
Thus, gp(k
p
t ) < g(kt) or that the KK curve with mortal conflict lies to the right of the KK
curve with peace when kpt+1 = kt+1. This implies that the steady state level of capital with
peace must be greater than the steady state value with mortal conflict. Graphically, this
proof compares point A and point a in Figure 1.
We summarize how the introduction of lethal violence alters the steady state capital:
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Proposition 3. (Violence and Steady State Capital) Violence from mortal conflict
lowers steady state capital compared with the capital in a conflict-free society.
Over time, violence and capital adjust monotonically towards their long-run steady states.
For instance, consider the transition from a conflict-free steady state (point A) to one with
mortal conflict (points A’ and B’). Once mortal conflict is introduced, capital is initially
above the new steady state equilibrium capital stock. Because the interior steady state
for capital is globally stable, capital will fall over time towards the new steady state. As
capital falls along the KK’ curve, violence rises along the XK’ curve. The same sort of
adjustment occurs anytime the initial capital stock is above its steady state level, while
the reverse happens when capital is below its steady state.7 This adjustment over time
of violence and capital to their steady state levels provides a rigorous foundation for the
negative relationship expressed in the conventional opinion mentioned in the introduction
that violence inhibits development or that development inhibits violence. We express these
sentiments more formally as:
Proposition 4. (Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium) Capital and violence are
inversely related along the path to steady state.
So far, we have shown how mortal conflict affects steady state violence and capital com-
pared to the peaceful steady state. Next we analyze how the stationary equilibrium reacts
to changes in economic fundamentals such as technology A, patience β, the deadliness of
conflict ψ, and the population growth rate n. To analyze steady state behavior, we drop time
subscripts in equations (16) through (19) characterizing the dynamic equilibrium. Totally
differentiating this system implies first that
∆kdk = (−k) dn+ (
k
A
∆k
1− α
)dA+ sβdβ + sψdψ (20)
7We note that because XK is more elastic when capital is low, low income locations will see greater
changes in violence when adjusting to steady state than locations with high income.
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where sβ and sψ are defined in (15) and where we define
∆k = 1 + n+ (1− α)
rsr
k
− α
wsw
k
= (1 + n) (1− α) (1 + (1− x) (1− J) (θ − 1)) > 0
Another implication of total differentiation is
dx = (−xr (1− α)
r
k
)dk + (xr
r
A
)dA+ xβdβ + xψdψ (21)
where xr, xβ, and xψ are defined in (14). Using (20) to substitute for dk in (21) yields
dx = Xndn+XAdA+Xβdβ +Xψdψ (22)
where
Xn = xr (1− α) r > 0,
XA = 0
Xβ = xβ
1
1 + (1− x) (1− J) (θ − 1)
> 0
Xψ = xψ
1
1 + (1− x) (1− J) (θ − 1)
> 0
We find that shocks that promote capital deepening can have a variety of effects on
violence. To see this, note that shifts to the KK curve are given in (20) and shifts to the XK
curve are given in (21). The complete effect on violence of both curves shifting at same time
is given by (22). Graphically, the KK curve shifts up in Figure 1 when A, β, or ψ increase or
when n falls. The increase in the steady state capital is associated with a movement along
the XK curve and a reduction in violence. Separately, the XK curve shifts leftward when
either A or β or ψ increase. The complete effect on violence from both curves shifting is
zero for productivity shocks and positive for patience shocks. That is, the effect on violence
from both curves shifting is exactly offsetting for a productivity shock, but for a patience
shock the shift of the XK curve dominates.
We summarize the response of capital and violence in:
Proposition 5. (Comparative Steady States) Steady state capital rises when the
population growth rate or the deadliness of conflict falls or when productivity or the rate of
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patience rises. However, the steady state level of violence falls when the population growth
rate or patience falls, or when the deadliness of conflict rises, but remains unaffected by
productivity shocks.
That impatience or deadliness implies lower violence and capital is fairly striking. Indeed
the result appears almost counter-intuitive, because it seems to be saying that youth or more
deadly weaponry does not lead to more lethal violence. But this result can be understood
by remembering that impatience or deadliness cause savings to fall and thus reduces the
prize in the survival contest. In turn, a smaller prize reduces the incentive for violence and
also leads to lower capital in the long run. Another striking finding is that not all sources
of growth are a remedy for violence as illustrated by the neutrality of production technology
shocks. Though this result is due to functional form assumptions, it does suggest that one
can not infer that growth inevitably is associated with a reduction in violence.8
5 Does Plunder Matter?
So far, mortal conflict has only involved survival and the opportunity to consume savings
in old age. More realistically, violent conflict often involves some element of plunder. To
capture plunder, we now allow winners in the survival contest to also appropriate the savings
of the dead losers. This effectively increases the prize of the survival contest and thus should
increase violence. On the other hand, because there is now an external source of old-age
income, savings by all should fall. The reason is that the type of plunder we consider
functions like social security, both processes redistributing from the young that die early to
old survivors.
With plunder lifetime old age consumption for agent i changes from rt+1s
i
t to rt+1[s
i
t+s
j
t ]
and the individual optimality conditions are modified accordingly. The Euler condition
8Resources devoted to violence xw behave somewhat differently than the propensity for violence x, which
we have denoted as violence. Though technology shocks do not alter violence, they do increase resources
devoted to violence, which rise together with capital and the wage rate. Similarly, though a higher population
growth rate encourages violence, resources devoted to violence may fall if the decline of wages is sufficiently
strong. We note for later that the degree of plunder also tends to move violence and wages in opposite
directions, so that violence and resources devoted to violence need not move in the same direction.
14
becomes (
wt
(
1− xit
)
− sit
)
−θ−1
= πitβrt+1
(
rt+1[s
i
t + s
j
t ]
)−θ−1
(23)
and the conflict condition is now
dπit
dxit
Vt = π
i
t where Vt =
θ
θ − 1
sit + s
j
t
w
(24)
The conditional violence expression derived from the conflict condition looks just like before,
except that the new definition for Vt contains the sum of savings. In other words, we now
have a contest with a homogenous prize rather than the heterogeneous prizes we considered
previously. More importantly, the conditional savings expression derived from the Euler
equation looks different than before, because it now includes the plunder from the adversary’s
savings:
sit = J
i
t+1wt
(
1− xit
)
− J it+1Q
i
t+1s
j
t (25)
where just like before J it+1 =
(
1 +Qit+1
)
−1
and Qit+1 = (π
i
tβ)
−θ
(rt+1)
1−θ .
We see that violence remains a strategic complement for individuals. That is, one agent’s
increase in violence will produce a conflict externality and a positive reaction in the violence
of the adversary. However, with plunder, the saving decisions of the adversaries now also
have a strategic element. Because higher savings by one will add to the prize of the survival
contest and so induce an offsetting reduction of the savings by the adversary, savings choices
in effect become strategic substitutes.
Proceeding as before, we find that the Nash equilibrium yields identical survival proba-
bilities πit = π =
1
2
ψ and identical violence levels xit = x˜t and, thus, identical savings s
i
t = s˜t.
But now x˜t is higher than before, because the prize Vt includes the plunder from the conflict
x˜t =
(
1−
π
ψ
)
Vt where Vt =
θ
θ − 1
2s˜t
wt
(26)
Setting sit = s˜t in (25) and solving the interdependences in (25) and (26), we find that the
Nash equilibrium values for savings and violence are
s˜t (wt, rt+1) =
J(rt+1)
1 + 2J(rt+1)Λ + J(rt+1)Q(rt+1)
wt (27)
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x˜t (rt+1) =
2J(rt+1)Λ
1 + 2J(rt+1)Λ + J(rt+1)Q(rt+1)
(28)
Comparing actions with plunder (x˜t and s˜t) to those without (xt and st), we see that s˜t < st
and x˜t > xt. The comparison is misleading, because it assumes that wages and interest
rates are constant - something that is not necessarily true when comparing equilibria. We
offer a fuller statement below when we compare stationary equilibria.
Totally differentiating s˜t (wt, rt+1) and x˜t(rt+1) in (27) and (28), we see that the responses
are qualitatively similar to the responses of violence and savings without plunder. First, we
find that for violence
dx˜ = x˜wdw + x˜rdr + x˜βdβ + x˜ψdψ (29)
where
x˜w = 0
x˜r =
x
r
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
(θ − 1) > 0,
x˜β =
x
β
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
θ > 0,
x˜ψ =
x
ψ
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
θ > 0
and for savings
ds˜ = s˜wdw + s˜rdr + s˜βdβ + s˜ψdψ (30)
where
s˜w =
s
w
∈ (0, 1) ,
s˜r =
s
r
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
(θ − 1) > 0,
s˜β =
s
β
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
θ > 0,
s˜ψ =
s
ψ
(1− x)
2 (1− J)
(2− J)
θ > 0
The main difference compared to mortal conflict without plunder is that now most derivatives
increase by a factor of 2/ (2− J) , but qualitatively there is no difference.
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We characterize the new dynamic Nash equilibrium in
Proposition 6. (Dynamic Nash Equilibrium with Plunder) When there is plunder,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium solution for violence and savings with x˜t(rt+1) ∈ [0, 1]
and s˜t (wt, rt+1) ∈ [0, wt] . The response of violence and savings to changes in wages, interest
rates, patience, and the deadliness of conflict is qualitatively similar to the responses without
plunder. There also exists a unique interior intertemporal equilibrium described by the capital
dynamics of the previous section with s˜t (wt, rt+1) replacing st (wt, rt+1) in (16).
Next, we look at how the graph introduced in Figure 1 changes with the introduction of
plunder. We first need to verify that the KK and the XK curves retain their shapes with
plunder. The KK curve stays concave because :
g˜′(k˜t) =
Jαwt
k˜t
(1 + n)
(
1 + Υ 1−x˜
2−J
) > 0
g˜′′(k˜t) = − (g˜
′)
2 Υ
g˜
[
1 +
Υ 1−x˜
2−J
1 + Υ 1−x˜
2−J
J (2− J) + (2x˜− J) (1− J)
(1− J) (2− J)
]
−
1− α
k˜t
(g˜′) < 0
where for comparison with the earlier case Υ 1−x˜
2−J
replaces Υ(1− x) where just like earlier
Υ = (1− J) (θ − 1) (1− α) . Also looking at the XK curve, we can see that violence is
bounded or x˜(kt+1) ∈ [0,
2Λ
1+2Λ
]. Violence falls over its range as kt+1 rises from zero towards
infinity according to
x˜′(k˜t+1) = − (1− x˜) x˜
Υ
k˜t+1
2
1− J
< 0
x˜′′(k˜t+1) = −
[
1 +Q (1− Λ)
1 +Q+ Λ
+
1
Q
+
J
2− J
]
Υ
k˜t+1
−
1
k˜t+1
< 0
Having verified that the shapes of the KK and XK curves are the same as in Figure 1, we
show in Figure 2 how plunder affects equilibrium violence and capital. Introducing plunder
makes the KK curve shift downward (from KK to KK’) and also makes the XK curve shift to
the left (from XK to XK’) with the x-intercept rising from (1 + (Λ)−1)−1 to (1 + (2Λ)−1)−1.
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Figure 2: Different Forms of Violence and Capital Accumulation
k(t)
k(t+1)
x(t)
KK
KK'
0
A
A'B'
XKXK'
B
ab
The net effect of both shifts is reinforcing for violence and steady state violence rises from
point B to B’ at the same time steady state capital falls from point A to A’.
More formally, to show that plunder increases violence and decreases capital, assume
that k˜t+1 = kt+1 so that J(r˜t+1) = J(rt+1) with 0 < kt+1 < ∞. Then comparing (11) and
(28) we see that xt > x˜t. Also, k˜t+1 = kt+1 implies s˜t = st in (27) and (12). Because
J(r˜t+1) = J(rt+1), it must be that the wage associated with k˜t is larger than the wage
associated with kt, which implies k˜t > kt when k˜t+1 = kt+1. Thus, g˜(k˜t) > g(kt) when
k˜t+1 = kt+1, or that the KK curve associated with k˜t lies to the right of the KK curve
associated with kt along a line that holds kt+1 fixed. From this we infer that the steady
state capital with plunder is less than the steady state capital without plunder. Graphically,
the proof compares points B’ and b for violence and points a and A’ for capital in period t
along a line that holds capital in period t + 1 fixed. The argument identifies the XK and
KK curves with plunder and the XK’ and KK’ curves without plunder in Figure 2. Thus,
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we have shown that
Proposition 7. (Stationary Equilibria With and Without Plunder) In the long
run, plunder aggravates violence and weakens capital compared with the violence and capital
without plunder.
So far we have contrasted the scenario where all of the opponent’s savings is plundered
to that where none gets plundered. Rather than have plunder be all or nothing, we could
easily let adversaries take only a fraction of the opponents savings and so parameterize the
degree of plundering. If we let σ be the share of savings that is appropriated when one
side wins, then old age consumption for agent i changes to rt+1[s
i
t + σs
j
t ]. This implies a
conflict condition where the prize for the individual V it now is proportional to s
i
t + σs
j
t
Thus, the prizes are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous as in the conflict condition in
equation (24). Having heterogeneous prizes introduces a potential difficulty, that is resolved
since the Nash equilibrium involves symmetric players. It can be easily verified that the
symmetric Nash equilibrium is described by the earlier equations except that 1 + σ replaces
2 in equations (27) and (28).
It is now straightforward to see that an increase in the degree of plundering (σ) leads to a
fall in steady state level of capital and an increase in steady state violence. As for the shocks
considered earlier (technology A, tastes β, deadliness ψ, and the population growth rate n),
it is clear that their steady state effects have not changed qualitatively. Thus, we conclude
with the following proposition that collects all the previous comparative steady state effects:
Proposition 8. (Shocks to the Stationary Capital Equilibrium with Violence)
Greater impatience or deadliness of conflict reduces steady state capital and violence. A
lower population growth rate or a lower degree of plunder leads to a higher steady state level
of capital and a lower steady state level of violence. An exogenous technological advance
raises steady state capital without any effect on violence.
This final proposition suggests that there may be a variety of fundamental reasons why
different regions have such disparate development-violence outcomes. Of course, economic
fundamentals are only part of the story. Government and social institutions also matter.
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In the present context, these institutions could be thought of as producing forces that either
mimic the factors that change the expected horizon (impatience and deadliness) or that
mimic factors that alter the pressure for violent appropriation (population and degree of
appropriation). The latter factors appear as incentives that shift resources from violence
to capital formation, where loosely speaking, one could interpret the degree of plundering
as how well property rights are enforced by governments or encouraged by social norms. Or
else, government and social institutions could create forces that mimic technology changes,
which fit in neither camp since they are neutral with respect to violence.9 Alternatively,
one could think of government and social institutions as creating forces that may be thought
of as primarily shifting the XK curve, or the KK curve, or both. An important question
for the future is whether these forces are violence reducing and development enhancing, or
whether they produce less desirable outcomes.
The final proposition, also, suggests that not all proposals for violence reduction are
equally desirable in a social welfare sense. The key lies in recognizing that the recipe
for violence reduction varies depending on whether or not the competitive equilibrium is
dynamically inefficient. Indeed one can show that dynamic inefficiency restricts the set
of acceptable measures for violence reduction, while dynamic efficiency implies that Pareto
improving violence reduction must leave capital unaffected to unambiguously increase welfare
or else it will cause some generation to suffer during the transition to a new steady state.
Alternatively, if transitional welfare receives low weight, anti-violence measures would also
have to encourage capital formation.
To see this most simply, denote the stationary Golden Rule level of capital as kGR and
recall that kp is the peaceful or conflict-free equilibrium level of capital. Using standard
arguments one can easily show that the socially optimal level of violence is zero.10 The issue
9As mentioned previously, moving away from homothetic preferences would allow the possibility that
wage-increasing technology shocks lead to higher or lower violence.
10The socially optimal level of violence is zero, because it represents a pure resource loss to society that is
minimized when all adversaries foreswear violence. Given the optimal level of violence, we note that a Millian
social welfare function with equal treatment of all generations produces the standard Golden Rule capital
level in our framework. We adopt this welfare criterion because population growth remains exogenous as
lethal violence only affects survival to old age. If lethal violence killed youths or if fertility were endogenous,
one would have to address optimal population considerations when determining the socially optimal levels
of capital and violence, which depend crucially on the choice of welfare criterion, Millian or utilitarian.
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is how the equilibrium capital with violence k∗t (or k˜t) compares with k
GR. Either there is
capital overaccumulation with kGR < k∗t < k
p
t , or else there is underaccumulation with either
k∗t < k
GR < kpt or k
∗
t < k
p
t < k
GR.
In the first case, dynamic inefficiency provides a clear mandate for a policy measure
that simultaneously reduces capital and violence. Of the shocks considered in the final
proposition, we would want a policy that acted like shocks that decrease the effective horizon
for the individual, as would an increase in impatience or the deadliness of conflict. Thus, for
dynamically inefficient economies our model suggests that traditional policies like weapons
control may not be welfare-enhancing. Similarly, less traditional public health policies that
lead to an increase in the utility discount factor along the lines of Chakraborty (2004) might
also not be desirable. Instead, other anti-violence policies may have to be considered that
go beyond the scope of the final proposition and of this paper.
For dynamically efficient economies, anti-violence measures have to be neutral with re-
spect to capital to unambiguously increase social welfare; or else they would have to also
encourage capital formation to at least increase welfare in the long-run. This suggests a more
nuanced approach to anti-violence policies that may require combining several measures to
get the desired result. As an example of an anti-violence policy that is neutral with respect
to capital, one could imagine combining a measure that acted like the shocks that decreased
effective horizons with a measure that produced effects like a reduced pressure for violent
appropriation. One possible solution would be to allow an increase in the deadliness of
conflict and also increase property rights enforcement (through police or legal system). For
capital neutrality the balance would have to be made carefully, but if capital formation were
allowable or if transitional welfare had low weight, then property rights enforcement could
be given a higher priority. A less traditional way of achieving the same outcome would be
a policy that discouraged better health care (to reduce the utility discount factor) combined
with family planning polices to reduce population growth, with greater weight given to the
latter if transitional welfare effects receive little or no weight. While these policy options are
not necessarily the most realistic, they do suggest the difficulty of finding socially desirable
anti-violence policies when there is capital accumulation.
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6 Conclusion
We extend Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model by introducing mortal conflict
and interpreting individual survival as the outcome of a Tullock (1980) contest. Thus, we
are able to capture the reality that development is accompanied by violence. We show that
violence inhibits development compared to conflict-free economies. We also demonstrate
that violence and capital are negatively related on the path to steady state and that the
changes of the stationary levels of capital and violence can be positively or negatively related
depending on the underlying shocks to economic fundamentals.
We have made strong assumptions to keep the model clean and to better focus on the
capital-violence dynamics. Relaxing these assumptions would complicate but not materially
affect the essence of the analysis. Though we have indicated what kinds of anti-violence
measures may be most beneficial to society, our model can be thought of as providing a
dynamic framework for a more detailed future analysis of the role government and social
institutions in violence reduction. One important question to pursue is what types of norms
and bargaining arrangements can reduce violence and also encourage capital formation, per-
haps by considering arguments along the lines of Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002).
A related question in understanding how to reduce violence is how violent groups form in
the first place and evolve in dynamic economies, which may be pursued by introducing con-
siderations along the lines of Esteban and Ray (2006) into the dynamic framework. Finally,
one may want to consider the introduction of fear, which can be an important social force as
recent events have shown. If fear is interpreted as a collective force that distorts subjective
probabilities, then fear can be modeled as an externality that reduces the subjective prob-
ability of survival by a factor that depends on aggregate violence. Introduction of such a
fear factor can easily generate multiple equilibria and development death traps by changing
the shape of the equilibrium capital accumulation relationship in ways that are familiar from
the literature on poverty traps (Azariadis, 1996).
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